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Abstract
Social marketing is becoming increasingly important in contemporary
revenue management. Central to it is quantifying how consumers choose be-
tween alternatives and how they influence each other. This work considers
a new but simple multinomial choice model for multiple agents connected in
a recommendation network based on the explicit modeling of choice adop-
tion behavior. Efficiently computable closed-form solutions, absent from
analyses of threshold/cascade models, are obtained together with insights
on how the network affects decisions. In particular, a new measure of the
overall decision making power of individual agents, “decision share”, is pro-
posed. The centrality of “decision share” is underscored by how it may be
used, in a straightforward fashion, to generalize the model from dealing
with finite choice sets to measurable sets.
A stylized “brand ambassador” selection problem is posed to model tar-
geting in social marketing. Therein, it is shown that a greedy selection
strategy leads to solutions achieving at least 63% of the optimal value.
In an extended example of imposing exogenous controls, a pricing prob-
lem is considered wherein it is shown that the single player profit optimiza-
vi
tion problem is concave, implying the existence of pure strategy equilibria
for the associated pricing game.
The topic of herd behavior is touched on via a special case of the model.
In the course of that exploration, a new result for the Polya urn model is
developed which enables one to study the limiting behavior of “herding”
quantitatively.
Keywords : social networks, choice models, stochastic decision
models, social marketing, pricing, price competi-
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People seldom make choices in isolation. Not only are they influenced
by the recommendations of prominent public figures (Chung et al., 2013;
Grover and Fixmer, 2011), people are also influenced by family, friends and
others in the communities or interest groups they belong to.
While businesses have long been aware of both influence effects,
celebrity endorsements have historically been the most prominent mode of
influence-based persuasion. Over the past decade, however, improvements
in communications technology and increased access to that technology have
greatly facilitated the business use of peer-to-peer recommendation systems
to drive sales. Numerous web-based communities have emerged, allowing
consumers to share their views and experiences on products/services, and
engage in discussion on those views.
A growing body of evidence, much drawn from the aforementioned web-
based communities, strongly suggests that consumers are highly responsive
to recommendations from people within their social circles (see, for in-
stance, Keller and Barry, 2003; Smith et al., 2005; Bart et al., 2005; Bell
and Song, 2007; Iyengar et al., 2009, 2011; Racherla and Friske, 2012; eMar-
keter, 2014). This is especially true in the context of selection decisions
for infrequently purchased, moderately to highly priced products/services.
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Without giving up celebrity endorsements as an outreach tool, firms are
increasingly seeking to co-opt consumers as product evangelists.
Even in retail, social marketing is gaining prominence. Apple and many
other large firms use the “Net Promoter System” (Bain & Company, 2013)
where responses to questions like “how likely would you be to recommend...”
are aggregated to give an estimate of the difference between the percentage
of “promoters” and the percentage of “detractors”.
Internet social networks have stepped up to monetize the online so-
cial interaction that they mediate. For instance, the advertising system
of Facebook, the largest social networking site of the Western world, is
premised on making (targeted) advertisements more compelling through
endorsements (“likes”) by friends. As a testament to advertisers’ increased
focus on social marketing and their buy-in to the logic of Facebook’s adver-
tising scheme, in 2011, Facebook was already serving up about $1.58 billion
worth of Internet display advertisements in the United States ($3.15 bil-
lion worldwide). This figure rose to $2.07 billon ($4.28 billion worldwide)
in 2012, $3.17 billion ($6.99 billion worldwide) in 2013, and $5.29 billion
($11.49 billion worldwide) in 2014.
This work is premised on the proposition that choice is not only driven
by personal preferences and expertise, but also by the recommendations and
choices of others. Here, the choice behavior of multiple agents, connected
in a recommendation network, is studied. These agents face the same
finite set of alternative choices and possess individual-specific inclinations
towards those choices. As they simultaneously influence and are influenced
by each other, the actual choices they make typically would differ from
what would be suggested purely based on those inclinations.
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1.1 Overview of Thesis
In Chapter §2, a simple choice model that explicitly models the key feature
of recommendation networks — the agents’ option to adopt other agents’
choices — is presented. Analytical solutions are readily obtained from
the model, providing insights on how a recommendation network affects
choice. This characteristic has not been demonstrated in existing thresh-
old/cascade models (wherein simulation is generally required to compute
solutions).
In Chapter §3, the above model is extended to communities of agents.
Complementing the usual “market share” (“choice share” here) quantifica-
tions, a natural measure of the influence of each agent (“decision share”)
is developed. This measure also turns out to be the key to the natural
generalization beyond finite choice sets.
In Chapter §4, the “brand ambassador” selection problem, which models
targeting in social marketing, is presented. Though it is NP-hard, it is
shown that (1− 1/e)-optimal solutions can be efficiently computed.
In Chapter §5, an application of the model to counter-factual analy-
sis is presented. Specifically, marketing strategists seek to increase their
market share by optimally adjusting their product offering. This chap-
ter highlights that the model may be viewed as a “meta-model” of choice,
wherein existing choice models may be augmented with information about
a recommendation network (preferences over choice adoption behavior) and
“plugged in”.
In Chapter §6, a special case of the model is considered so as to study
herding behaviour. This investigation leads to a new result for the classic
Polya Urn model characterizing the distribution of the fraction of “balls”
in the “urn with the most balls” (Chen, 2014).
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1.2 Relationship With Existing Work
A number of authors have studied choice models where membership in
social groups affects outcomes. Notable examples are the work of Bramoullé
et al. (2009) and De Giorgi et al. (2010), who studied model identification
in a setting where decisions of agents (activity levels and binary choice
respectively) are affine in the “average behavior” of the agents’ social groups
(“linear in means”); Brock and Durlauf (2001) who considered (binary)
random utility maximization models where agents’ utilities are affine in
the “average group behavior”; and Brock and Durlauf (2002) who extended
the aforementioned binary model to a multinomial choice model wherein
the utility accruing to an agent for selecting a given choice is affine in the
average choice probability for that choice. Unfortunately, as Blume et al.
(2010) note in their survey article, there exists little work on multinomial
choice models with social interactions. Furthermore, closed form solutions
are generally not available even for binomial choice models. In this work, a
new multinomial choice model that models the effects of a recommendation
network is introduced. The model is a variant of the “linear in means” model
but generates (closed form) choice probabilities rather than “activity levels”.
As a bonus, the model is readily generalizable to infinite choice sets.
Also relevant to this work is the research program on learning in net-
works. The primary project within this domain of inquiry is the characteri-
zation of when beliefs do or do not converge to (the relevant representation
of) true state of the world. The literature on learning in networks may be
loosely classified into two sub-schools: Bayesian learning (e.g.: Acemoglu
et al., 2011), and “linear” learning (e.g.: DeGroot, 1974; Acemoglu et al.,
2010, 2013). There is also work that represents a “middle way” between
the two which may be loosely termed “impure Bayesian” learning (e.g.:
Jadbabaie et al., 2012). Within the Bayesian learning school, Acemoglu
et al. (2011) study a sequential learning model and characterize learning
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in a network where individuals observe private signals and some subset
of past actions. Within the “Impure Bayesian” learning school, Jadbabaie
et al. (2012) study a model of repeated interactions where agents perform
Bayesian updates on their personal signals and update their beliefs as a
weighted average of their (current) beliefs and those of their neighbors,
and show that in this setting agents are able to learn the true state of
the world. Within the “linear” learning school, Acemoglu et al. (2010)
and Acemoglu et al. (2013) study models of repeated interactions (discrete
and continuous) where update their beliefs as weighted averages of their
(current) beliefs and those of their neighbors, and study convergence and
non-convergence of beliefs of the population. In this work, a close con-
nection will be drawn between this work and a general model of “linear”
learning.
Viewed from the angle of social media marketing, this work has links
to the literature on the propagation of information/influence on a net-
work. The influence maximization problem was first proposed and studied
by Domingos and Richardson (2001). In that work, they proposed a gen-
eral descriptive model of influence propagation based on a Markov random
field, but proposed only simple local search heuristics for solving the in-
fluence maximization problem. Shortly after, Kempe et al. (2003, 2005)
considered two families of models of influence propagation, “cascade” mod-
els and “threshold” models, and applied them to influence maximization.
By demonstrating that the expected number of “active nodes” on termina-
tion of a given influence propagation process is monotone and submodular
in the initial subset of “active nodes”, they obtained (1− 1/e− )-optimal
( arbitrarily small) performance guarantees for greedy selection strategies
in the associated influence maximization problem.
Distinct from previous work, underpinning the model is an implicit ex-
tension of the choice set from the base set of alternatives to include the
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adoption of other agents’ choices, underscoring the fact that adopting the
choice of a particular agent is itself a distinct choice and reflecting a key
aspect of recommendation networks. Closed form choice probabilities may
be obtained in a computational tractable manner, making the model prac-
tical for large-scale social marketing applications. Like Kempe et al. (2003,
2005), (1−1/e)-optimal solutions to the “brand ambassador” selection prob-
lem may be obtained via the route of monotonicity and submodularity,




A Model of Discrete Choice for
an Individual Embedded in a
Social Network
A discrete choice model is a (stochastic) decision model wherein agents
are modeled as using some given decision processes, such as solving opti-
mization problems, to arrive at their choices. However, due to imperfect
knowledge on the part of the modeler, there is uncertainty (e.g.: paramet-
ric) about the agents’ decision processes, and thus the choices that will be
made. As such, choice models return not a single choice for each agent,
but a probability distribution over the set of alternatives. The most com-
monly used framework, random utility models, has agents maximizing over
a (finite) set of random utility functions, encompassing models like the
logit, probit and mixed logit. (See Train (2009) for an introduction, and
see Natarajan et al. (2009) for an interesting connection to discrete opti-
mization under uncertainty.) More broadly, discrete choice models feature
stochastic decision dynamics being modeled at varying levels of detail. For
example, Blanchet et al. (2013) introduce structure by modeling substi-
tution between choices as state transitions of a Markov chain; and at a
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distant extreme, Farias et al. (2013) completely eschew modeling decision
dynamics in favor of estimating distributions over all possible preference
orders.
In this paper, a choice model is presented based on a simple probabilistic
decision process: agents probabilistically make choices based on their own
preferences or adopt the choices of another agent.
Prior to describing the model, it would be useful to first define the
nomenclature:
• A: The (finite) set of agents.
• C: The (finite) set of choices.
• pik ∈ [0, 1]: Probability that agent i ∈ A will adopt the choice of
agent k ∈ A.
• P : A matrix of dimension |A| × |A| with (i, k) entry pik.
• qij ∈ [0, 1]: Probability that agent i ∈ A will select choice j ∈ C
without consulting the network.
• q(j): A vector of dimension |A| with i-th entry qij.
• piij: Probability that agent i ∈ A will pick choice j ∈ C.
Presently, the pik’s and the qij’s are defined as constant parameters. How-
ever, P and {q(j)}j∈C will be allowed to vary in the “brand ambassador”
selection problem of Chapter 4 and in the pricing problem of Chapter 5.
Subsequently, let ei be the i-th unit vector and let e be the vector of all
ones.
2.1 The Basic Model
The model considers the piij’s to be “steady state” choice probabilities which
allows one to dispense with the (likely contentious) stipulation of decision
making dynamics. At the core of this choice model is the explicit modeling
of a key aspect of recommendation networks, agents adopting the choices
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of other agents. The choice probabilities may then be described as follows
for i ∈ A, j ∈ C:
piij = P (i chooses j, i does not consult network)
+ P (i adopts some other agent′s choice of j) (2.1)
modeled
=









In this model, agents’ actions are driven by other agents’ actions, not
their expectations of other agents’ actions. (One might make a consistency
argument that both should coincide in “steady state”.) This may arise
through a mechanism like observational learning, but that detail is not ad-
dressed here. Naturally, it is required that the probabilities for the various






qij = 1, (2.4)
neatly segregating “adoption” and “direct selection” behavior. In addition,
it is assumed that
pii = 0 (2.5)
for all i ∈ A. Thus, each agent i is allowed |A|+ |C|−1 distinct actions: se-
lecting some element of C without consulting his/her network and choosing
to adopt the choice of some other agent in |A|.
Example 2.1.1 (The Classical (Disconnected) Setting) When P =
0, the choices agents make are not coupled through a recommendation net-
work. So piij = qij for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C. 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (2.1) is the contribution
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from agent i acting like an isolated individual, the second term accounts
for agent i’s actions due to “influence” from other agents. Equation (2.2)
encodes the modeling assumption that an agents adopts others’ choices in-
dependently of the choices the latter make. As such, the rejection of choices
due to differing preferences is not modeled. Also, the phenomena whereby
the knowledge of one’s influence changes the choices one makes (image
shaping) cannot be captured. These modeling gaps are acknowledged.
On a similar note, one implication of the model is that an agent may
select, with non-zero probability, something that he/she would never choose
if the agent were isolated. This is not an unrealistic outcome. An agent
may accept the recommendations of other agents on the basis that they
have information he/she does not have. In day to day life, people regularly
accept recommendations from friends to “try something new”. As such, this
would just be an instance of an agent extending his/her choice consideration
set due to peer influence.
From a broader perspective, equation (2.4) points to the implicit exten-
sion of the choice set from C to include adopting advice from other agents,
hinting at some underlying choice model over agents’ actions. In this light,
this model might be thought of as a “meta-model” of choice into which
single-agent choice models may be “plugged”.
2.2 Quantifying Choice Probabilities
The following regularity condition is assumed to ensure the piij’s are well-
defined:
Assumption 2.2.1 (Collective Decisiveness) The set Q := {i ∈ A :∑
j∈C qij > 0} 6= ∅, and for each i ∈ A\Q, there exists a sequence of agents
(ai1, a
i
2, . . . , a
i
ni+1
) such that ai1 = i, aini+1 ∈ Q, and for k = 1, 2, . . . , ni,
paikaik+1 > 0.
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Assumption 2.2.1 may be read as the requirement that, for each agent,
there exists a “probabilistic path” leading from that agent to some choice.
It is necessary and sufficient for choice probabilities to be well-defined, in
a sense. The technical implications of Assumption 2.2.1 are listed below:
Lemma 2.2.2 The following hold if and only if Assumption 2.2.1 holds:
(a) The spectral radius of P (largest eigenvalue of P by magnitude) is
strictly less than unity.
(b) (I − P )−1 is well-defined.
(c) For any principal sub-matrix1, V , of P , the matrix (I −V )−1 is well-
defined.
With that, based on the definition of the model, the choice probabilities
may be computed through an elementary exercise in linear algebra.
Proposition 2.2.3 (Individual Choice Probabilities) The probability
of agent i selecting choice j is given by:
piij = e
T
i (I − P )−1q(j). (2.6)
Proof. The result follows from equations (2.1)-(2.3) and part (b) of Lemma
2.2.2. 
To verify that, for agent i ∈ A, {piij}j∈C is indeed a probability distri-
bution, observe that the non-negativity of ei, (I−P )−1 (= I+P +P 2 + . . .)




e− Pe = (I − P )e, it is easy to verify that ∑j∈C piij = 1.
Example 2.2.1 (The Impact of Accepting Recommendations) Consider
the situation where there is an “influential” agent (1) and two other agents
1Up to permutations, all principle sub-matrices map bijectively to and from non-
empty subsets of A. For any non-empty B ⊆ A, the principle sub-matrix corresponding
to B is the matrix where the rows and columns corresponding to elements in A\B are
removed.
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This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 wherein agents are represented by circles,
choices are represented by squares, and decisions by agents are represented
by outgoing arcs. In the absence of network effects (thus normalizing the












q(j)’s), agents 2 and 3 would each have chosen B with probability 1. Network
effects, however, result in them choosing A with probability 0.4. 
It is useful to point out (again) that the outputs of the model are expec-
tations. Thus, the model remains open to further specification of decision
making dynamics which would enable one to model the joint distribution
of outcomes (which are vectors in C |A|).
2.3 Insights through Analogies: Decision Dy-
namics and Learning Dynamics
As with most network models, insights may be obtained from analogies.
Subsequently, equation (2.6) will be discussed from the perspectives of an
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appropriate discrete time Markov chain and also the “linear learning” of
choice probabilities that both lead to equivalent probabilistic outcomes.
2.3.1 The Markov Chain Analogy.
One may understand equation (2.6) to be evaluating the limiting distribu-
tion (over absorbing states) of a random walk on a graph, describing the
agents’ adoption propensities and preferences over alternatives, given some
initial distribution over its nodes (“states”). In this analogy, there are two
types of states, “agent i to make the choice” for each i ∈ A and “choice j
selected” for each j ∈ C. The latter are, of course, absorbing states.
In the “first step”, agent i chooses j with probability qij (“Choice j
selected”) and the probability that he adopts the choice of agent k (“Agent
k to make the choice”) is [eTi P ]k. Reasoning along these lines, in the “second
step”, the probability of j being picked increases by eTi Pq(j); in the “third
step”, it increases by eTi P 2q(j). This leads to the equivalent expression piij =
eTi (I + P + P
2 + . . .) q(j). Furthermore, under Assumption 2.2.1, with each
step, the probability that a choice has not yet been made (the probability
of the states {Agent i to make the choice}i∈A) decreases towards zero.
Note that one should not interpret sample paths in this Markov chain as
instances of decision making dynamics. Rather, this analogy is a (standard)
tool for explaining how a certain measure of “centrality” arises in network
models (see §3.2).
2.3.2 The Linear Learning Connection.
There is a compelling connection of this model to models of “linear learn-
ing”. Consider a discrete time system where, in each time step, each agent
updates his/her beliefs by combining some private signal with the current
beliefs of other agents (including himself/herself). Denoting the belief of
agent i at time t as x(t)i , and assuming that the beliefs may be represented
15








k + (1− αi)x(0)i
where it is assumed that
∑
k vik = 1 for all i, the vik’s are all non-negative
and αi ∈ [0, 1] for all i.
This is a generalization of the well-known DeGroot Model of linear
learning (DeGroot, 1974) (wherein αi = 1 for all i) and is similar to what
was presented by Acemoglu et al. (2010) (who studied a particular model
of interaction and learning in a community). In contrast to the DeGroot
Model, the above generalization enables agents to balance “local” infor-
mation, represented by the agents’ initial beliefs, with a “global overview”
gained from aggregating information from sources across the network, and
is thus a useful model of interaction and learning in communities.




x(t) = (I −DV )−1(I −D)x(0)
where x(t) is a vector of the x(t)i ’s, V is a matrix of the vik’s and D is a
diagonal matrix of the αi’s.
Comparing this with equation (2.6), DV plays a similar role as P and
(I−D)x(0) plays a similar role as q(j) (for some j ∈ C). (V is a scaling of P
so the rows sum to 1, and D reverses that scaling.) Given P and {q(j)}j∈C ,
one is able to find D, V and a x(0) for each j such that the outcome of the
linear learning process generates the choice probabilities. Specifically, V is
the matrix obtained from P by normalizing its rows to sum to 1, and αi
is the sum of entries in row i of P . To obtain x(0) from q(j), one simply
divides the i-th entry by 1− αi.




(= {qij/(1 − αi)}j∈C) is a discrete probability distribution over C. (This
follows from equation (2.4).) These discrete distributions may be thought
of as representing each agent’s idiosyncratic preferences over the set of
possible choices (denote these “personal choice probabilities”). The choice
probabilities of the model may be viewed as the limit of a set of linear learn-
ing processes, one for each choice j ∈ C. In particular, for choice j ∈ C, the
“local information” used are vectors of the “personal choice probabilities”
of the various agents for choice j, obtained from normalizing {qij}j∈C for
each agent i ∈ A and constructing a vector of the entries corresponding to
j.
One may argue that such processes of iterated averaging are suspect
because it is unclear what manner of object emerges from each iteration of
averaging. (e.g.: when averaging subjective survey responses across partic-
ipants.) However, “personal choice probabilities” have objective economic
meaning. Performing a weighted average is, precisely, mixing. Consider
running |C| such processes, one for each j ∈ C, such at that the initial
states of the |C| processes corresponds to a set of probability distributions
(one for each agent). One would find that at each time step, the above
property is preserved, and this holds as well in any limit (since the product
of probability simplexes is closed).
This discussion hints once more, albeit more directly, that the model is
a kind of “meta-model” of choice wherein different choice models may be
composed using information about agents’ propensities to adopt the choices
of others, leading naturally to a model for studying how social networks
affect the choices people make.
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2.4 Computational Issues.
Choice probabilities (and later, choice shares) can be computed in O(|A|3)
floating point operations with the coefficient of the leading term being 2/3
(see, for instance, Trefethen and Bau, 1997). Alternatively, because the
matrix I−P is diagonally dominant and typically sparse, efficient iterative
methods may be applied (see, for instance, Saad, 2003).
However, it is important to note that data generally contains noise,
leading to considerations of the sensitivity of choice share to perturbations
of P and {q(j)}j∈C . Given P , the less “decisive” the agents are (the smaller
all of the numbers {∑j∈C qij}i∈A are), the closer the spectral radius of P is
to 1, the more sensitive the choice shares are to {q(j)}j∈C , and the greater
the care needed when interpreting computational results.
2.5 A Comparison with Kempe et al. (2003,
2005).
It would be useful to touch on how the model relates to those presented
in Kempe et al. (2003, 2005). In particular, it is shown that this choice
model is not just a special case of their models with multiple “activation”
categories. To this end, following an equivalence result of Kempe et al.
(2005), it would suffice to consider their general “decreasing cascade model”.
Consider using Monte Carlo simulation of some “cascade process” con-
structed to replicate the expected outcome of the model. Sample runs
should be based on equation (2.4), which outlines the possible actions of
each agent, and equations (2.1)-(2.3) should be deducible from the stipu-
lated dynamics. Thus leading, under Assumption 2.2.1, to equation (2.6).
This may be sketched out as follows, begin by sampling the agents
who select a choice without consulting their neighbors (and their choices)
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based on {q(j)}j∈C . (For alignment with the “decreasing cascade model”,
let some choice u ∈ C correspond to “non-activation”.) A kind of “cascade
process” will be used to determine the choices of the remaining agents, who
will adopt the choices of others. Following Kempe et al. (2003, 2005), let
agents who have already made choices in C (less u) be known as “activated”
agents. For each “unactivated” (undecided) agent i except those that picked
u initially, each “activated” agent k with pik > 0 will have, at most, one
opportunity to have the former agent adopt the the “activated” agent’s
choice (with some probability to be described later), thus “activating” the
undecided agent (none if pik = 0). Once no “activation attempts” remain,
the process terminates. Naturally, instances where (i) not all agents make
a choice, or where (ii) no agent picks u initially but some agent remains
unactivated, will be discarded.
In line with equation (2.4), the aforementioned “activation probabil-
ities” may be computed from {pik}i∈A,k∈A by conditioning on the set of
agents whose choices were not adopted (“failed activation attempts”) and
also on the event that an “unactivated” agent did not make a choice without
consulting his/her network (beginning “unactivated”). So, one may indeed
deduce equations (2.1)-(2.3) from the stipulated dynamics. This is con-
sistent with the interpretation that each agent selects from an “extended
choice set” comprising choices in C and the adoption of the choices of other
agents. The sequencing of “activation attempts” may be done arbitrarily as,
equivalently, an outcome is fully determined by a sample (with rejection)
from a discrete distribution with |A| + |C| − 1 categories for each agent
i ∈ A with selection probabilities {pik}k∈A,k 6=i and {qij}j∈C .
In the above “cascade process”, the activation probabilities are, for each
undecided agent, strictly increasing in the set of agents who had previously
“attempted” and failed to “activate” the undecided agent. That violates the
assumptions of the “decreasing cascade model” which requires those prob-
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abilities to be decreasing. This is because each “failed activation attempt”
increases the set of actions (to adopt the choice of some other agent) that
were not taken. Conditional on the aforementioned set of actions not being
taken, the probability of each of the remaining actions necessarily increases
in that set of actions. Example 2.5.1 will make this clear.
Example 2.5.1 (An “Increasing” Cascade) Consider, again, Example
2.2.1 and an outcome defined by the bold arrows of Figure 2.2. Agents 1
and 2 have both selected choice B without consulting others in the network
(let A correspond to u). They then will attempt to “activate” agent 3 (get
agent 3 to adopt their choices) according to the “cascade process” sketched
out above.












If agent 1 attempted to “activate” agent 3 first, the probability of “acti-




, and if agent 2 attempted to “activate” agent
3 after agent 1 failed, “activation” would occur with certainty (p32
p32
= 1).
Similarly, if agent 2 attempted to “activate” agent 3 first, the probability




, and if agent 1 attempted to “acti-
vate” agent 3 after agent 2 failed, “activation” would occur with certainty
(p31
p31
= 1). So for a given “activated” agent, “activation” probabilities are
strictly increasing in the set of agents who failed to activate agent 3. 
20
Thus, general as the models of Kempe et al. (2003, 2005) are, the model
presented here is not a mere special case featuring multiple “activation”
categories.
2.6 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.2.2. If (a) holds, then the sum I + P + P 2 + . . . is
well-defined, implying (b). Conversely, (b) cannot hold unless (a) holds. So
(a) and (b) are equivalent. Clearly, (c) implies (b). To see how (b) implies
(c), consider the matrix PV formed by keeping the entries corresponding
to V and setting the rest to 0. For n ≥ 1, the entries of P nV and the
corresponding entries of V n are equal and P n dominates P nV entry-wise.
Therefore, (I − PV )−1 is well-defined and so is (I − V )−1. So (a), (b) and
(c) are equivalent.
To show that Assumption 2.2.1 implies (a), first note that the Perron-
Fröbenius Theorem states that P , being a non-negative matrix has
a positive real eigenvalue λ that is maximal in terms of magnitude
with corresponding left eigenvector, v, having strictly positive terms.









( > 0 by Assumption 2.2.1),
and let N = maxi∈A\Q ni. Since the row sums of P are non-negative but
at most unity, for all m,n > 0 and vectors u ≥ 0, uTP ne ≥ uTP n+me ≥ 0.
Therefore, for all m > 0, λmN = vTPmNv ≤ vTPmNe ≤∑i∈A vieTi Pmnie ≤
(1− )mvT e. This implies that λ < 1, meaning (a) holds.
To show how (a) implies Assumption 2.2.1, the contrapositive will be
proven. Suppose Assumption 2.2.1 does not hold. If Q = ∅ then P is a
row-stochastic matrix and 1 is an eigenvalue of P with its corresponding
left eigenvector consisting of all ones, so suppose Q 6= ∅. Let Y be the sub-
set of A\Q for which no path satisfying the requirements of Assumption
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2.2.1 exists. For all i ∈ Y , by equation (2.4), ∑k∈Y pik = 1. Otherwise a
path satisfying the requirements of Assumption 2.2.1 may be constructed
by augmenting a path from an agent in (A\Q)\Y to Q. Thus, the sub-
matrix of P corresponding to the agents in Y is row-stochastic. So 1 is
an eigenvalue of P with its corresponding left eigenvector having 1’s in the
entries corresponding to agents in the set Y and 0’s elsewhere. So Assump-
tion 2.2.1 implies (a), meaning Assumption 2.2.1 and (a) are equivalent,




Having touched on the basics of the model from the elementary perspective
of a single agent making a choice, these ideas will now be extended to
consider the extension to communities. “Choice share”, an analogue to
“market share”, will be presented along with a new measure of decision
making power of agents which will be termed ”decision share”. Decision
share has a clear economic interpretation and turns out to present a direct
route for generalization to infinite choice sets.
3.1 Choice Share
While equation (2.6) considers the behavior of a single agent, applications
typically require consideration of the aggregate choices of a community.
Therefore, a natural generalization would be to consider each agent having
a non-negative endowment to allocate to the choices, and also to denote the
expected amount (of the total endowment) allocated to a given choice its
“choice share”. (This may be thought of as an analogue to “market share”.)
For each agent i ∈ A, let i’s endowment be wi ≥ 0 and let w be a vector of
the wi’s. Denote the choice share of j ∈ C with respect to endowment w,
piwj :
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Definition 3.1.1 (Choice Share) The choice share of choice j with re-





T (I − P )−1q(j). (3.1)








Example 3.1.1 (Choice Share: Revisiting Example 2.2.1) Consider
Example 2.2.1 with w = 1
3
e. The choice shares of A and B turn out to be
7/15 and 8/15 respectively. 
3.2 Decision Share
Choice share measures the allocation of a community’s total endowment to
choices in C. One might also ask how much of the allocation of the total
endowment to choices in C is, in expectation, (ultimately) determined by
a given agent i. Given an endowment vector w, let δwi denote the “decision
share” of agent i ∈ A, and define it as the expected amount allocated to
choices in C due to agent i selecting a choice without consulting his/her
network. Decision share may be quantified as follows:





where w (w ≥ 0) is an endowment, cw = wT (I − P )−1 and q¯ = ∑j∈C q(j).
Proof. To derive the δwi ’s, an instance of the model will be considered
where the choice shares measure how much of the total endowment each
agent directly allocates to the choices in C. Consider a problem with a new
set of choices C¯ = A. Replace {qij}i∈A,j∈C with {q˜}i∈A,j∈C¯ such that for
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i ∈ A, q˜ii = q¯i = 1−
∑
k∈A pik and q˜ij = 0 for j 6= i. The interpretation is
that when a choice in C is selected, what is tracked is not how much of the
endowment is allocated to that choice, but rather which agent made that
decision. Noting that q˜(i) = (1− eTi Pe)ei = (eTi (e− Pe))ei = (eTi q¯)ei, and
δwi = w
T (I − P )−1eieTi q¯ = cwi q¯i the proof is complete. 
Example 3.2.1 (Decision Share: Revisiting Example 2.2.1) Consider
Example 2.2.1 with w = 1
3
e. The decision shares for agents 1, 2 and 3 are
7/10, 3/20 and 3/20 respectively. 
Example 3.2.2 (Decision Share: Isotropic Fully Connected Network)
Suppose for ρ ∈ [0, 1), pik = ρ/(|A| − 1) for all i, k ∈ A, i 6= k, then
δwi =
|A| − 1
|A| − 1 + ρ
(
(1− ρ)wi + ρ|A| − 1w
T e
)
gives the resulting decision shares for endowment w. 
Example 3.2.3 (Decision Share: “Hub and Spoke” Network) Let agent
h ∈ A be the “hub” in a “hub and spoke” network. (That is, agent h is con-
nected to all other agents, and agents other than h are only connected to
h.) Suppose ρ ∈ [0, 1], pih = ρ for all i, k ∈ A, i 6= h, and suppose the other
p′iks are 0. Then
δwi =
 (1− ρ)wi + ρw
T e (i = h)
(1− ρ)wi (i 6= h)
gives the resulting decision shares for endowment w. 
Example 3.2.4 (Decision Share: Fully Connected Network with a Hub)
Let agent h ∈ A be a “hub” in a fully connected network. Let ρF ∈
[0, 1), ρH ∈ (0, 1] with ρF + ρH < 1. Consider an increasing sequence
of agents and their corresponding endowments {(An, w(n))}n≥1 with |An| →
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∞. For each n ≥ 1, let pik = ρF/(|An| − 1) for all i, k ∈ An, i 6= k,
k 6= h and pih = ρF/(|An|−1)+ρH for all i ∈ An, i 6= h. Suppose also that
















gives the asymptotic ratio of the decision share for the “hub” agent h to the
total endowment. 
The decision share of i depends on the extent to which others in the
network adopt i’s decisions, including choice adoption, (cwi ) and how “deci-
sive” i is (q¯i). cwi is a network characteristic best understood via the Markov
chain analogy, and q¯i is an individual characteristic measuring how often i
makes decisions without consulting the wider network. These bear further
explanation.
3.2.1 Centrality.
In the discussion of §2.3.1, [(I − P )−1]ki gave the expected frequency that
state i (“agent i to make the choice”) would occur if the initial state were
k (“agent k to make the choice”). With that analogy in mind, note that
when cwi (= wT (I−P )−1ei) is large, agent i would determine the (ultimate)
choice more often. Thus, cwi is a measure of the reliance of the network
on agent i for decision making. In particular, it is a weighted centrality
measure for agent i, a generalization of Katz centrality (Katz, 1953) or of
Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1987).
The “centrality-connection”, pioneered by authors like Katz (1953) and
Bonacich (1987), has been made in many economic settings where agents
interactions may be described using a network. For example, in network
games with local payoff complementarities, “central” agents benefit by free-
riding on the efforts of other agents (Ballester et al., 2006; Bramoullé and
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Kranton, 2007), or by being compensated for the positive externalities they
exert (Candogan et al., 2012); In financial networks, shocks can be amplified
through a network effect modulated by centrality and a market effect due
to “fire-sales” of illiquid assets that further depress asset values (Chen et al.,
2013).
3.2.2 Decisiveness.
Yet, “central” as it has been in measuring the “importance” of nodes in
networks, centrality is not the sole determinant of decision share. Decision
share is the product of cwi (= wT (I − P )−1ei) and q¯i (= eTi (I − P )e). The
latter term is the i-th component of
∑
j∈C q
(j), and the larger it is, the more
likely agent i makes a choice “on his own” rather than by adopting another
agent’s choice. Thus, it is not unreasonable to use q¯i as a measure of agent
i’s “decisiveness”.
One might say that decision share is centrality — the extent to which
the community leans on an agent for decision making — modulated by
“decisiveness”, which gives the likelihood that that agent “decides” when
“called upon” to do so. This is reasonable and intuitive.
Additionally, the more “decisive” agents in A are, the lower the impact
of network effects; and with “indecisive agents”, one might reason that,
given reasonable decision dynamics, “herding” would be observable in the
joint distribution of choices. A discussion on this is provided in Chapter
6, including the quantification of the expected size of the largest “herd” in
a specialized setting which turns out to be a new result for the classical
Polya urn model.
3.2.3 Putting the Two Together.
To connect the two, consider a mechanical analogy describing the ultimate
selection of choices. Let there be a network of pipes with leaky joints, one
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corresponding to each i ∈ A. The fraction of fluid entering joint i that
flows out to joint k ∈ A is pik and the fraction that leaks out is q¯i (and the
specific fraction that leaked fluid going to j ∈ C being qij/q¯i for qi > 0).
Flow from joint to joint corresponds to choice adoption, and leakage
corresponds to ultimate choice selection. Thus, giving joint i an initial
infusion of wi for each i ∈ A, the total cumulative flow into joint i is
cwi = w
T (I −P )−1ei. With a fraction q¯i leaking out, the total amount that
leaks from joint i is δwi (= cwi q¯i). This is illustrated by (the bold arrow in)
Figure 3.1.







3.3 Decisiveness and Herding
Consider an example with C = {−1, 1} and qi,j = η/2 for both j ∈ C.
Suppose also that P is a matrix with equal entries in all its off diagonal
entries and zeros on its diagonal. In this case, it is clear that the choice
shares are equal. Under the simulation process described in §2.5, each non-
rejected realization yields a “choice vector” X ∈ C |A| = {−1, 1}|A| listing
the respective choices of each agent. Obviously, E [X] = 0 since the choice
shares are equal. However, one may easily verify that in the limit η ↓ 0, in
almost every sample, all agents end up making the same choice based on
a single “decisive individual”. This occurs because it becomes increasingly
unlikely (with decreasing η) that more than one agent selects a choice
without relying on others in the network.
With the above example in mind, it is clear that in regimes of low
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decisiveness, as quantified by by {∑j∈C qij}i∈A, herding emerges. This is
explored in Chapter 6 using a special case of the model wherein for each
i ∈ A, pik1 = pik2 for all k1, k2 ∈ A (k1 6= k2 6= i).
3.4 Decision Share and Going Beyond Finite
Choice Sets.
Decision share provides a convenient route to generalization. Suppose C
were no longer a finite set. Taking the place of the q(j)’s would be a col-
lection of probability measures on C, one for each agent (the set of agents
remaining finite). In this setting the decision shares remain well-defined,
being fully determined by w and P . Qualitatively, the resulting “choice
share distribution” of the total endowment
∑
i∈Awi would be a “mixture”
of the aforementioned probability distributions (over C) associated with
the various agents, with the decision shares as the “mixing weights”.
Specifically, suppose each agent i ∈ A had preferences over C described
by probability measure µi. Consider a subset S ⊆ C. The choice share of
S is then ∑
i∈A
δwi µi(S), (3.3)
which is natural and intuitive given the definition of decision share.
Equation (3.3) suggests that one may view choice outcomes as arising
from a latent class model with |A| classes of choice behaviors described
by {µi}i∈A. In particular, an agent with index i (agent i) behaves like
“someone” in class k with probability δeik . Alternatively, {δeik }k∈A describes










In the introduction, a great deal was said about social marketing. In this
sub-section, a problem faced by the many marketing departments is cast
in terms of this model. Specifically, as businesses seek to co-opt consumers
as product evangelists, they face the problem of identifying who to reach
out to so as to maximize the effectiveness of their marketing dollar.
Here, the “brand ambassador” selection problem will be introduced,
and it will be shown that though it is NP-hard, it admits and efficiently
computable approximate solution that is guaranteed to be at least 1− 1/e
(about 63%) as good as the optimal solution.
4.1 A Model of Social Marketing
Given some choice j ∈ C (that represents the brand whose choice share
one seeks to maximize), the objective of the “brand ambassador” selection
problem is to pick a subset B ⊆ A of at most K agents, who will select
choice j exclusively, such that the choice share of j is maximized. Making
P and {q(l)}l∈C functions of the set of brand ambassadors selected, brand
ambassadors’ exclusive recommendation of j may be modeled as follows:
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With apologies for the abuse of notation, for B ⊆ A, let
[P (B)]ik =




0 (k ∈ B, l 6= j)
1 (k ∈ B, l = j)
qkl (k 6∈ B).
(4.2)
These mean that agents selected as brand ambassadors are modeled as
changing their behavior such that they recommend and select choice j only
(with probability 1). Other agents are unaffected.
(As a technical digression, note that if Assumption 2.2.1 is valid when
B = ∅, then it is valid for all B ⊆ A. This is because P = P (∅) ≥ P (B)
entry-wise for all B ⊆ A, implying that the spectral radius of P (∅) is
greater than P (B) since both are non-negative matrices.)
4.2 Characteristics of the Model
The brand ambassador selection problem may be expressed as follows:
max{piwj (B) : B ⊆ A, |B| ≤ K}. (4.3)
Due to its combinatorial nature, it is not surprising that:
Proposition 4.2.1 The optimization problem (4.3) is NP-hard.
In spite of this result, it remains possible to obtain good solutions for the
brand ambassador selection problem. It will be demonstrated that prob-
lem (4.3) admits an efficient (1 − 1
e
) approximation via a greedy selection
strategy that may be described as follows:
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Algorithm 1 Greedy Algorithm (subject to maximum cardinality K)
S0 ← ∅
for i = 1 to K do
a∗i ← arg max
ai∈A\Si−1
piwj (Si−1 ∪ {ai})
Si ← Si−1 ∪ {a∗i }
end for
return SK
As in Kempe et al. (2003, 2005), the proof of approximability makes use
of a classic result due to Nemhauser et al. (1978) on the approximate max-
imization of monotone submodular functions with the greedy algorithm.
A submodular function f over a set Ω is a set function such that for ev-
ery X, Y ⊆ Ω with X ⊆ Y and every x ∈ Ω\Y , f(X ∪ {x}) − f(X) ≥
f(Y ∪ {x})− f(Y ) (see Chapter 44 of Schrijver (2004)). A monotone sub-
modular function is a submodular function such that for every X, Y ⊆ Ω
with X ⊆ Y , f(Y ) ≥ f(X). (Notably, the proof of submodularity in
Kempe et al. (2005) relies on the “activation probabilities” possessing the
decreasing property. This is not present in the natural “cascade model”
that generates the results of this model (§2.5).)
Theorem 4.2.2 (Nemhauser et al. (1978)) If the greedy algorithm is
used for the approximate maximization of a non-negative monotone sub-
modular set function f over a set Ω, the value of the solution generated by










(The interested reader may refer to Krause and Golovin (2012) for more
details on the maximization of monotone submodular functions, including
a minor extension to the above result.)
In the brand ambassador selection problem, the incremental choice
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share due to adding an additional brand ambassador is always non-negative
(choice share is monotone in B):
Lemma 4.2.3 (Incremental Benefit of an Additional Brand Ambassador)
If a ∈ A\B,








where MB = (I − P (B))−1 and pTa is the row of P corresponding to agent
a.
Before going on to establish the submodularity of piwj (·), it would be
instructive to discuss equation (4.4) in the context of some recent empirical
findings. In a recent study, Godes and Mayzlin (2009) used data from a
large-scale field test and an online experiment to study the efficacy of the
proactive management of customer-to-customer communication by firms.
Among other findings, they provided evidence that it is not necessarily
“highly loyal” customers who generate the important incremental “word-
of-mouth” (WOM) as one might have expected, and that it may be more
beneficial for firms to target “less loyal” customers.
In equation (4.4), wTMBea may be viewed as a weighted centrality mea-
sure for agent a. (Note thatMB decreases entry-wise in B, so the centrality
of each agent decreases as more brand ambassadors are added.) The larger
wTMBea is, the larger the choice share contribution from including agent
a. This accords well with the “folk” practice, mentioned in Godes and May-
zlin (2009), wherein firms seeking to engineer WOM begin by attempting
to identify “key influencers”.
On the other hand, including agent a would not accord j an incremental
benefit amounting to all of agent a’s “residual” centrality (given the current
set of brand ambassadors). Firstly, agent a may already been selecting/rec-
ommending choice j himself/herself. Furthermore, a’s inclusion causes an
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indirect reduction in the choice share of j because agent a would have, prior
to being included in the set of brand ambassadors, selecting choice j due to
adopting the choices of other agents. This is why, as suggested by Godes
and Mayzlin (2009), firms seeking to engineer WOM should identify “key
influencers” outside “communities” of “loyal users”.
While the equation (4.4) hints at the submodularity of piwj (·), it is insuf-
ficient to establish submodularity as MB decreases entry-wise in B. Still,
submodularity can indeed be demonstrated:
Proposition 4.2.4 (Submodularity in the Brand Ambassador Setting)
piwj : A→ R is monotone and submodular for all w ≥ 0.
With this, it follows immediately from Theorem 4.2.2 that:
Theorem 4.2.5 (Approximability in the Brand Ambassador Setting)






described by Algorithm 1.
When agents are associated with heterogeneous costs, one has to deal
with more general knapsack constraints. Sviridenko (2004) developed a






the computational cost is considerably higher (O(n5) function evaluations).
4.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1. The result will be proven via a reduction
of the Vertex Cover Problem which is known to be NP-complete. Consider
an instance of the Vertex Cover Problem defined by an undirected graph
G = (V,E) and an integer K. Therein, a set, S, of K vertices is sought
such that every edge in E has at least one end point in S.
Create an instance of the Brand Ambassador Selection Problem with
A = V and C = {α, β}, with j = α and w as the vector of all ones. For
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all i ∈ A, qiα = 0 and qiβ = 1/2. (Note that Assumption 2.2.1 is satisfied.)
Denote η(i) as the number of vertices adjacent to i in the graph G and
let η = max
i∈A
η(i). For each i ∈ A, let pik = 0 if (i, k) 6∈ E and pik = 12η(i)
otherwise.
For any vertex cover S, P (S) and {q(l)(S)}l∈C are such that agents




(n + K). But for any subset of A, S˜ where |S˜| = K and S˜ is
not a vertex cover. Then there exists (r, s) ∈ E such that r, s 6∈ S˜. This
implies that piwα (S˜) ≤ 12(n+K)− 14η < piwα (S).
By Lemma 4.2.3, piwα (·) is monotone. Therefore any optimal solution to
this instance of the Brand Ambassador Problem may be (trivially) identi-
fied with a solution to the Vertex Cover Problem. In fact, a bijection exists
between the set of optimal solutions for the brand ambassador problem and
the set of vertex covers. Therefore, the Brand Ambassador Problem is at
least as computationally hard as the Vertex Cover Problem. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2.3. By the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula
for an invertible matrix A, if A+ uvT is invertible, then




The corollary follows by applying this to











Proof of Proposition 4.2.4. Monotonicity follows from Lemma 4.2.3.
To prove submodularity, it suffices to verify that for all X ⊆ Y ⊆ A and
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a ∈ A\Y ,
piwj (X ∪ {a})− piwj (X) ≥ piwj (Y ∪ {a})− piwj (Y )
and to do so for all non-negative w. Thus, it is necessary and sufficient to
show that for all i ∈ A,
pieij (X ∪ {a})− pieij (X) ≥ pieij (Y ∪ {a})− pieij (Y ) (4.6)
for arbitrary X, Y , a satisfying X ⊆ Y ⊆ A and a ∈ A\Y .
Before proceeding, first, observe that
pieij (X) = 1 if i ∈ B. (4.7)
Now, consider the four possible cases, i = a, i ∈ X, i ∈ Y \X and
i ∈ A\(Y ∪ {a}).
When i = a, pieij (X ∪ {a}) − pieij (X) = 1 − pieij (X) and pieij (Y ∪ {a}) −
pieij (Y ) = 1 − pieij (Y ) by equation (4.7). Since pieij (Y ) ≥ pieij (X) by mono-
tonicity, inequality (4.6) holds.
When i ∈ X, pieij (X ∪ {a}) = pieij (X) = pieij (Y ∪ {a}) = pieij (Y ) = 1 by
equation (4.7), so inequality (4.6) holds.
When i ∈ Y \X, pieij (X∪{a})−pieij (X) ≥ 0 by monotonicity and pieij (Y ∪
{a})− pieij (Y ) = 1− 1 = 0 by equation (4.7), so inequality (4.6) holds.
For each i ∈ A\(Y ∪ {a}), consider equations (2.1)-(2.3) which defines













for S∩(Y ∪{a}) = ∅. For given i ∈ A\(Y ∪{a}), the “analogous” coefficients
and the constant remain the same for all such sets S. This is because the
respective rows of P and q(j) remain unchanged.
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By part (c) of Lemma 2.2.2, it follows that pieij (S) may be expressed as
a non-negative linear combination of {piekj (S)}k∈Y ∪{a} plus a non-negative
constant:






This is achieved by considering the linear system defined by (4.8) for i ∈
A\(Y ∪{a}) and “pre-multiplying it” by (I−PA\(Y ∪{a}))−1 where PA\(Y ∪{a})
is the principle sub-matrix of P defined by the subset A\(Y ∪ {a}).
For each i ∈ A\(Y ∪ {a}), the constants and the coefficients of
{piekj (S)}k∈Y ∪{a} of equation (4.9) are the same for every choice of S ⊆ A
satisfying S ∩ (Y ∪ {a}) = ∅. Therefore, since inequality (4.6) holds for all






One of the most important business applications of discrete choice is the
study of the variation of choice probabilities with respect to (exogenous)
changes in problem parameters such as price and the “design” of choices
(for instance, product characteristics). Once estimated from data, choice
models are applied in the pricing of offerings or even in product-line design.
Early in this paper, the model presented was cited as a “meta-model”
of choice, which might have attracted some protest at the time because
{q(j)}j∈C was constant, thus apparently precluding the aforementioned ap-
plications. In conjunction with the foregoing discussion of the brand am-
bassador selection problem, this sub-section will make clear that no such
restriction exists.
Here, the model will be generalized to relate the choice share to an ex-
ogenous parameter. This will be illustrated, mainly, by way of an extended
example on pricing/price competition.
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5.1 Extending the Model
Suppose that for all i ∈ A, k ∈ A, l ∈ C, pik(·) and qil(·) are functions
of a (possibly multi-variate) parameter u ∈ Rd with base values P (0) =
P and q(j)(0) = q(j) for all j ∈ C. Once again, with apologies for the
abuse of notation, define P (u) to be the matrix containing the entries
{pik(u)}i∈A,k∈A, q(j)(u) the vector containing the entries {qij(u)}i∈A, and
piwj (u) = w
T (I − P (u))−1q(j)(u) (5.1)
to be the choice share of j given endowment w (w ≥ 0) and parameter u.
Naturally, a mild assumption will be made to ensure a meaningful mapping
from u to the pik(·)’s and the qij(·)’s:
Assumption 5.1.1 There exists a non-empty set T ⊆ Rd such that for all
u ∈ T , Assumption 2.2.1 holds for P (u) and {q(j)(u)}j∈C, P (u) is a non-
negative matrix, q(j)(u) is non-negative for all j ∈ C, and ∑j∈C qij(u) +∑
k∈A pik(u) = 1 for all i ∈ A. Furthermore, without loss of generality,
0 ∈ T and P (0) = P and q(j)(0) = q(j) for all j ∈ C.
Consider the following example illustrating how this framework may be
applied:
Example 5.1.1 (Univariate Affine Variation of the Preferences of a Single Agent)
Consider the special case of “affine variation” in the preferences of some
agent r¯ ∈ A, where P (u) = P − uer¯vT with qj(u) = qj + uer¯, ql(u) =




l∈C\{j} βl = 1. Then the
following expression for the choice share of j:
piwj (u) = pi
w






holds on an interval containing 0 where θik(u) is defined in Lemma 5.4.1
of §5.4.
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In the case of “pure preference shifting” where v = 0, equation (5.2)
reduces to piwj (u) = piwj (0) + uθir¯(0). Equation (5.2) may be obtained using
the same method used in Lemma 4.2.3. Furthermore, Lemma 4.2.3 can be
easily verified to be a special case of equation (5.2). 
5.2 A Model of Pricing and Price Competi-
tion
As an extended example, a simple model of pricing/price competition will
be presented. Here, some strict subset of choices D ⊂ C will correspond to
products sold by different firms which are engaged in price competition. (It
may be taken that C\D contains an “outside option”.) Here, endowments
should be interpreted as “units of choice”, and choices and firms will be
referred to interchangeably using elements of D.
For j ∈ D, denote the base profit for j per “unit of choice” by mj
(mj > 0), and denote the firm’s (real-valued) decision variable, the price
discount to be granted, as zj. Denote the vector of price discounts for
D\{j} as z−j. Of course, the model parameters are determined by {zl}l∈D.
Suppose that, for j ∈ D, the parameters may be described as univariate
functions for any given z−j. The following model that describes substitution
into a choice as it becomes more attractive: Given z−j, suppose that the
set T on which Assumption 5.1.1 is a non-empty interval and on T ,
• qij(·, z−j) is concave and strictly increasing, and
• qil(·, z−j) (l ∈ C, l 6= j) and pik(·, z−j) (k ∈ A), are convex and
decreasing.
(Appropriately defined affine functions satisfy this.) Suppose, in addition,
that for j ∈ D, firm j is limited to offering price discounts zj ∈ Sj :=
[Lj, Uj] where and Lj > −∞ and Uj ≤ mj.
For (zj, z−j) where choice shares are well-defined, piwj (zj, z−j) may be
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defined analogously as before and the profit for j ∈ D denoted as
Πj(zj, z−j) = (mj − zj)piwj (zj, z−j). (5.3)
Otherwise, let the profit for j ∈ D be −∞. Thus, given z−j, firm j’s profit
is concave in zj:
Proposition 5.2.1 (Concavity of Profit) For all j ∈ D, Πj(·, z−j) is
concave on Sj.
This means that the associated single player pricing problem may be effi-
ciently solved. Furthermore, Proposition 5.2.1 allows one to quickly deduce
that:
Theorem 5.2.2 (Equilibrium in Pricing Game) The game G = ({Πj}j∈D, {Sj}j∈D)
has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
5.3 Applications of Decision Share to Analy-
ses of Multidimensional Preferences and
Product Feature Design
The above extended example illustrated the interaction of influence and
personal preferences driven by pricing considerations.
One may consider a richer setting wherein customers (agents) have mul-
tidimensional preferences and firms (players) have multidimensional prod-
uct feature parameterizations. Any set of decisions on product features by
firms would induce choice probabilities for each customer over the offering
of the firms. With or without network effects, this induces a game where
firms select product designs so as to maximize their profits (or market
share). Unfortunately, this setting is far too general to analyze.
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Consider, a more specific setting where preferences and product feature
occupy a common Euclidean space, and, all else being equal, the closer a
product design is to a customer’s preferences, the more likely a customer
is to select the product. This setting is analogous to the well studied
area of multi-dimensional spatial competition which has been of particular
interest for the analysis of elections. However, it would be premature to
point the interested reader to the literature given that we are not aware of
existing work of the above sort where network effects within the population
of customers (or voters) is accounted for.
Thankfully, one may use the concept of decision share can be used to
reduce such a game with network effects to one without network effects. In
particular, the effective endowment of an agent in the network-effect-free
game would then be, by equation (3.3), δwi instead of wi. This greatly sim-
plifies analysis of such games and connects analyses considering network-
effects to the broader literature.
5.4 Proofs
Lemma 5.4.1 Suppose Assumption 2.2.1 is valid for P (u) and let θik(u) :=









































































By (a) of Lemma 2.2.2, (I − P (u))−1 is well-defined, so through straight-
forward differentiation, one obtains
d
du
pieij (u) = e
T










(I − P (u))−1q(j)(u)
]
.
By collecting terms, one arrives at equation (5.4). Equation (5.5) may be
obtained in a similar fashion. Equation (5.6) may be obtained by differen-
tiating equation (5.4). 
Lemma 5.4.2 (Monotonicity) For given j ∈ C, if for all i ∈ A, qij(·)
is increasing, pik(·) are decreasing for all k ∈ A, and qil(·) are decreasing
for all l ∈ C\{j}, then for a non-negative initial endowment w, piwj (·) is
increasing on T , and for l ∈ C\{j}, piwl (·) is decreasing on T .
Proof. The proof of this lemma makes use of Lemma 5.4.1 in §5.4.
First, note that because (I − P (u))−1 = I + P (u) + P (u)2 + . . . and
P (u) ≥ 0,
θik(u) ≥ 0 (5.9)
for all i, k ∈ A.
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= Gkj(u) (defined by (5.7) in Lemma 5.4.1)
where the first inequality follows from the hypothesis that qil(·) are de-
creasing for all l ∈ C\{j}, and the second inequality follows from the fact
that piekj (u) ∈ [0, 1] for all k ∈ A. Taken together with equation (5.4) of
Lemma 5.4.1 and Corollary 3.1.1, one may deduce that piwj (·) is increasing.
For l ∈ C\{j}, since piesl (u) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ A and, by hypothesis,
the other terms on the right hand side of equation (5.7) are non-positive,
Gkl(u) ≤ 0. Thus, similarly, one may deduce that piwl (·) is decreasing. 
Notably, Lemma 5.4.2 generalizes Lemma 4.2.3.
Lemma 5.4.3 (Concavity/Convexity) Suppose the conditions of Lemma
5.4.2 hold and, in addition, ∀ i ∈ A, qij(·) is concave, pik(·) is convex for
all k ∈ A, and qil(·) is convex for all l ∈ C\{j}, then piwj (·) is concave on
T , and for l ∈ C\{j}, piwl (·) is convex on T .
Proof. The proof of this lemma makes use of Lemma 5.4.1 in §5.4.
As with (5.9) in the proof of Lemma 5.4.2, θik(u) ≥ 0 for all i, k ∈ A.




θik(u) ≤ 0. (5.10)
for all i, k ∈ A.
In the proof of Lemma 5.4.2, it was previously shown that Gij(u) (see
(5.7) in Lemma 5.4.1) is non-negative. Based on equation (5.6) of Lemma
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5.4.1, to show that pieij (·) is concave, it would be sufficient to show that
Hkj(u) ≤ 0.



























piesj (u) ≤ 0.
Now, for k ∈ A and any fixed γs ∈ [0, 1] for each s ∈ A, by manipulating
































where the inequality follows from the convexity of qkl(·) for l ∈ C\{j} and
the convexity of pks(·) for s ∈ A.
Substituting piesj (u) for γs, the fact that Hkj(u) ≤ 0 is established.
Therefore, pieij (·) is concave. Combining this with Corollary 3.1.1, it follows
that piwj (·) is concave.
Now consider l ∈ C\{j}. In the proof of Lemma 5.4.2, it has already
been shown that Gil(u) ≤ 0. So it suffices to show that Hkl(u) ≥ 0 for all
k ∈ A. By Lemma 5.4.2, d
du
piesl (u) ≤ 0 for all s ∈ A. It then follows from
the hypothesis of Lemma 5.4.2 that Hkl(u) ≥ 0. In the same way as before,
one may deduce that piwl (·) is convex. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2.1. By Lemma 5.4.2 and Lemma 5.4.3 of §5.4,
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the piwj ’s are monotone and concave in the discounts granted. Therefore,
where choice shares are well-defined,
d2
dz2j
Πj(zj, z−j) = (mj − zj) d
2
dz2j
pi(zj, z−j)− 2 d
dzj
pi(zj, z−j) ≤ 0.
Noting that Πj(zj, z−j) = −∞ for zj where choice shares are not well-
defined, it follows that Πj(·, z−j) is concave on Sj. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2.2. Since the pay-offs are concave on the respective
Sj’s, which are compact convex sets, G is a concave game. By a result due
to Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan, G has a pure strategy equilibrium (see, for




Exploring Herding Behavior via
a Model of Preferential
Attachment
In §3.3, an example wherein herd behavior emerged was featured. There,
it was suggested that herding occurs in groups of decision makers when the
individual decision makers are not “decisive”. In particular, the choices of
the few agents who do not adopt the choice of another agent serve as the
basis of the choices of all other agents.
As before, to be able to consider joint outcomes of the model, as opposed
to marginal distributions, the simulation process described in §2.5 is used.
In this chapter herd behaviour is studied using a special case of the model
wherein conditional on an agent adopting the choice of some other agent,
that agent has the same probability of choosing any other agent’s choice to
adopt. In such a setting, conditional on the “decisive agents” (those who
made their choices without adopting those of other agents), each outcome
may be described as a forest with agents as nodes, “decisive agents” as roots
of trees in the forest, and links corresponding to choice adoption behavior.
It would not be unreasonable to regard each such tree as a “herd” because,
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in each tree, every agent’s choice is ultimately an adoption of the choice of
the agent at the root.
Should one only be interested in the number of agents in each “herd”,
the distribution of outcomes matches that of a process of proportional
“preferential attachment” of undecided agents to agents who have already
made a choice (whether by choice adoption or otherwise). This precisely
matches the classic Polya urn problem. To assess the extent of herding, one
might seek to understand the distribution of the size of the largest herd.
This problem is challenging for a given (finite) number of agents and may
be simplified by considering limiting fractions of the number of agents in
the largest herd. Unfortunately, the analogous problem in the classic Polya
urn setting has not been studied.
The modest contribution of this chapter, most of which was published
in Chen (2014), is to derive the limit distribution of the fraction of balls in
the “heaviest” bin in the classic Polya urn problem via explicit analytical
expressions for all its moments, and apply the result to the study of herd
behaviour.
6.1 Weighting the “Heaviest” Polya Urn
The Polya urn problem describes a well-studied family of random processes
that have been fruitfully applied in diverse fields ranging from telecommu-
nications to understanding self-organizing processes like network formation
and herd behavior. In the classical Polya urn problem, one begins with d
bins, each containing one ball. Additional balls arrive one at a time, and
the probability that an arriving ball is placed in a given bin is proportional
to mγ, where m is the number of balls in that bin.
The case of γ = 1, which corresponds to a process of “proportional
preferential attachment” and is a critical point with respect to the limit
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distribution of the fraction of balls in each bin is considered. It is well
known that for γ < 1 the fraction of balls in the “heaviest” bin (the bin
with the most balls) tends to 1/d, and for γ > 1 the fraction of balls in the
“heaviest” bin tends to 1. (See, for instance, surveys such as (Chung et al.,
2003) and (Pemantle, 2007) or books such as (Johnson and Kotz, 1977)
and (Mahmoud, 2008).) Unexpectedly, though scientists and engineers are
interested in analogous quantities such as “the size of the largest (biological)
plague”, this question has not been explored for the case of γ = 1.
As previously mentioned, in this chapter, the limit distribution of the
fraction of balls in the “heaviest” bin for γ = 1 will be derived via explicit
analytical expressions for all its moments.
6.1.1 The Result
Denote the number of balls in the “heaviest” urn (when there are d urns),
after a total of n− d ≥ 0 balls are added, as Hd(n). For integer m ≥ 0 and










For notational convenience, let M00 := 1. There are three equivalent ways
of describing M (m)d :










(m+ d− k − 2)!




























This result is an explicit characterization in the sense that the compu-
tations to be done using either of equations (6.2) thru (6.4) are explicit
(typically simple arithmetic) rather than implicit (e.g.: solving a system of
equations). One readily observes that this is so because the next M (m)d to
be computed depends only on already computed moments. (It is clear that
M
(0)
d = 1 for all d ≥ 1 and M (m)1 = 1 for all m ≥ 1.)
The first and second moments being typically of special interest, equa-
tion (6.4) may be used to compute them:
Corollary 6.1.2 (Limiting Mean/Second Moment)
1
d
































Direct computation reveals that the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the
standard deviation to the mean) of the fraction of balls in the “heaviest”
urn rises to a peak of about 0.27 at d = 10, after which it begins to decline
to a limiting value of 0.
More generally, though the recurrences enable us to obtain expressions
for any given moment by iterated substitution, there does not appear to
be any special structure that enables drastic simplification. This is unfor-
tunate.
One might observe that the balls that did not make their way into
the “heaviest” urn are allocated to the other d − 1 urns in the same way
as in a Polya urn model with only those d − 1 urns. This follows from
exchangeability, thus yielding a straightforward, albeit tedious, method to




Illustrations of Proposition 6.1.1 may be found in Figures 6.1 thru 6.8
along with simulated average fractions of balls in the “heaviest” urn and
quantiles obtained from simulation (for n ranging from 100 to 20,000).
Those simulations suggest that the limiting values are good approximations
even for systems with just thousands of balls added.













Expectation: Proposition 6.1.1 (n→∞)
Simulation Mean
Simulation Quantiles: 0.2 and 0.8
Simulation Quantiles: 0.05 and 0.95
Figure 6.1: Maximum Fraction of Balls in the “Heaviest” Urn: The Limiting
Mean and Simulated Data (n = 100; 10,000 samples)













Expectation: Proposition 6.1.1 (n→∞)
Simulation Mean
Simulation Quantiles: 0.2 and 0.8
Simulation Quantiles: 0.05 and 0.95
Figure 6.2: Maximum Fraction of Balls in the “Heaviest” Urn: The Limiting
Mean and Simulated Data (n = 250; 10,000 samples)
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Expectation: Proposition 6.1.1 (n→∞)
Simulation Mean
Simulation Quantiles: 0.2 and 0.8
Simulation Quantiles: 0.05 and 0.95
Figure 6.3: Maximum Fraction of Balls in the “Heaviest” Urn: The Limiting
Mean and Simulated Data (n = 500; 10,000 samples)













Expectation: Proposition 6.1.1 (n→∞)
Simulation Mean
Simulation Quantiles: 0.2 and 0.8
Simulation Quantiles: 0.05 and 0.95
Figure 6.4: Maximum Fraction of Balls in the “Heaviest” Urn: The Limiting
Mean and Simulated Data (n = 1, 000; 10,000 samples)













Expectation: Proposition 6.1.1 (n→∞)
Simulation Mean
Simulation Quantiles: 0.2 and 0.8
Simulation Quantiles: 0.05 and 0.95
Figure 6.5: Maximum Fraction of Balls in the “Heaviest” Urn: The Limiting
Mean and Simulated Data (n = 2, 000; 10,000 samples)
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Expectation: Proposition 6.1.1 (n→∞)
Simulation Mean
Simulation Quantiles: 0.2 and 0.8
Simulation Quantiles: 0.05 and 0.95
Figure 6.6: Maximum Fraction of Balls in the “Heaviest” Urn: The Limiting
Mean and Simulated Data (n = 5, 000; 10,000 samples)













Expectation: Proposition 6.1.1 (n→∞)
Simulation Mean
Simulation Quantiles: 0.2 and 0.8
Simulation Quantiles: 0.05 and 0.95
Figure 6.7: Maximum Fraction of Balls in the “Heaviest” Urn: The Limiting
Mean and Simulated Data (n = 10, 000; 10,000 samples)













Expectation: Proposition 6.1.1 (n→∞)
Simulation Mean
Simulation Quantiles: 0.2 and 0.8
Simulation Quantiles: 0.05 and 0.95
Figure 6.8: Maximum Fraction of Balls in the “Heaviest” Urn: The Limiting
Mean and Simulated Data (n = 20, 000; 10,000 samples)
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6.2 Implications for Herd Behavior
Given heterogeneous agents (i.e.: agents i with different values of
∑
j∈C qij),
distribution of the largest herd arising from the simulation process de-
scribed in §2.5 is hard to analyze. However, good approximations for the
distributions of the number of “decisive agents” (those whose choices are
not based on choice adoption), may be readily obtained.
Conditioning on there being d “decisive agents”, one obtains an instance
of the Polya urn model with d urns, allowing one to use Proposition 6.1.1
and (and Corollary 6.1.2, in particular) to approximate the distribution of
the size of the largest herd.
Combining the two, one may then approximate the distribution of the
largest herd under a special case of the model. Denote Dˆ as the (random)
number of decisive agents, and denote H˜max as the size of the largest herd.
As an example, an approximate bound on the size of the largest herd
is provided using the results above and Jensen’s inequality.
Lemma 6.2.1 (Differences of M (1)d ) For d > 0, ∆d := M
(1)
d+1−M (1)d < 0
(M (1)d is decreasing in d) and ∆d+1 −∆d > 0 (M (1)d has strictly increasing
differences).
Corollary 6.2.2 There exists a convex function f on the domain {x ∈ R :
x ≥ 1} such that for integer d, f(d) = M (1)d . In particular, the piecewise


































Going a little further, should one desire to evaluate the “risk” associated
with herding as the expectation of some (smooth) function of the fraction
of agents in the largest herd, given that the moments are decreasing and
bounded between 0 and 1 and that numerical experiments indicate the
limiting distributions are “close” for reasonably sized populations of agents,
good Taylor approximations may be computed.
While it would be inappropriate to draw too many conclusions from this
stylized model, however it is somewhat telling that Jeong et al. (2003) found
that “measurements on four networks, namely the science citation network,
Internet, actor collaboration and science coauthorship network indicate that
the rate at which nodes acquire links depends on the node’s degree, offering
direct quantitative support for the presence of preferential attachment”.
6.3 Proofs.
Before proceeding to the proof of Proposition 6.1.1, for completeness, the
following well known result on the distribution of the number of balls in
each bin is reproduced and a proof provided:
Lemma 6.3.1 The number of balls in the d urns after m additional balls
are added is uniformly distributed on
S(d,m) := {v ∈ Zd : v ≥ e, vT e = d+m}. (6.7)
Furthermore,







Proof. Let the probability that vk balls are in the k-th urn (of d) after m
additional balls are added be pi(d,m)(v). Clearly, pi(d,0)(e) = 1. If pi(d,m)(v) =
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where the first equality follows from the dynamics of preferential attach-
ment. Now, |S(d,m)| = 1/η(d,m), and |S(d,0)| = 1. Therefore, by equation
(6.9),







and the proof is complete. 
Subsequently, Lemma 6.3.1 and a simple partitioning of the set of pos-
sible outcomes (S(d,m), a discrete simplex) will be used to characterize the
limiting distribution of the fraction of balls in the “heaviest” urn. In addi-
tion, the following easily verifiable fact will be exploited.
Lemma 6.3.2 For integer a, b > 0 and real-valued c > 0,
∫ c
0
xa(c− x)b dx = a!b!
(a+ b+ 1)!
ca+b+1. (6.10)
Proof of Proposition 6.1.1. Clearly, M (0)d = 1 and M
(m)
1 = 1. For cases
where m > 0 and/or d > 1, an expression for the desired moment for finite
n will be constructed, and the limit as n→∞ evaluated.
Now, the set S(d,(α−1)d) (for α ∈ N), as defined in Lemma 6.3.1, may be
expressed as the following disjoint union:







where T(α,d,µ,τ) := {v ∈ Zd : v ≥ µe, vT e = αd, γ(v, µ) = τ} and γ(v, x) :=
|{k : vk = x}| is the number of entries of the vector v with the value x.
This is so because there is a single vector in S(d,(α−1)d) where all entries take
the same value (αe), and α − 1 other possible values of the smallest entry
of vectors in S(d,(α−1)d) (specifically, 1, 2, . . . , α − 1). In each of the latter
cases, the number of entries taking on the minimum value may range from
1 to d− 1.
Noting that vectors in T(α,d,µ,τ) have τ entries taking value µ, and d− τ
entries taking values strictly larger than µ, the cardinality of T(α,d,µ,τ), must
be |S(d−τ,(α−µ)d−(d−τ))|multiplied by the number of ways to pick the τ entries
































which, itself, may be proven directly by induction.
Now, equation (6.1) may be written equivalently as
E [Hd(n)m] = M (m)d n
m + o(nm) (6.12)
for integer m ≥ 1. Equation (6.12) clearly holds for d = 1. Now, sup-
pose that equation (6.12) is true for 1, 2, . . . , d − 1 urns. Using the fact
that conditional on realizations being in T(α,d,µ,τ), the uniform probability
of outcomes implies that the distribution of Hd(n) is identical to the (un-
conditional) distribution of Hd−τ ((α − µ)d) + µ, the m-th moment of the














d−τ ((α− µ)d)m−kµk + o(αm) (6.13)
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∣∣T(α,d,µ,τ)]( (α− µ)d− 1




















d−τ ((α− µ)d)m−kµk + o(αm)
] [
((α− µ)d)d−τ−1





















d−τ ((α− µ)d)m−kµk + o(αm)
]
(α− µ)d−2dd−2




















d−1 ((α− µ)d)m−kµk + o(αm)
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(m+ d− k − 2)!k!












(m+ d− k − 2)!











(m+ d− k − 2)!
(m+ d− 1)! M
(m−k)
d−1 .
The seventh equality follows from an application of Lemma 6.3.2 to
evaluate the integral.
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(m+ d− k − 2)!
(m+ d− 1)! M
(m−k)
d−1 .
also arises for all increasing positive integer sequences {nr}∞r=1 whose ele-
ments are greater than d but are not all necessarily integral multiples of
d.
Note that given any n, for βx,d := dbx/dc, it holds that βn,dd ≤ n ≤
(βn,d + 1)d. Since, in the right-hand-size of equation (6.14), both the nu-
merator and denominator are increasing in α, one can construct upper and
lower bounds by using either βn,d or βn,d + 1 accordingly in place of α in
the numerator and denominator. For both bounds, the same leading order
terms arise and hence the same limits. Therefore, with this sandwiching,
equation (6.2) is established.
With equation (6.2), one may reduce the multiple term recurrence to
a two term recurrence, yielding equation (6.3), and then perform iterative






















m+ k − 1
 m























(The second equality holds because M (m−1)1 = 1.) Simplifying yields equa-
tion (6.4), as desired. 


























is negative. This follows because M (1)d ≥ 1/d > 1/(d+ 1).
To show that M (1)d has increasing differences, note first that ∆2−∆1 =
1/9 > 0 and that (1/(d + 1) − 2/d + 1/(d − 1)) > 0 for d ≥ 2 due to the









































































In this work on choice modeling, premised on the notion that the presence
of a recommendation network extends the set of available decisions to in-
clude choice adoption behavior, a simple model of choice was developed
where decisions are influenced by peers. A natural outcome of the model-
ing assumptions is that each agent’s choice probabilities turns out to be a
mixture of the “personal choice probabilities” of all agents in the network,
a mixture weighted by some measure of influence of each other agent on
the agent in question.
At a more qualitative level, this work is an attempt to provide a compu-
tationally tractable choice model that reflects the following: (i) that agents
have estimates of their preferences over items in the set of alternatives, (ii)
that agents have beliefs about the extent of their knowledge of items in the
set of alternatives, (iii) that agents are cognisant that others in their social
circles may have useful knowledge (about the set of alternatives and the
knowledge of others in the community) that is compactly summarised in
the latter agents choices, and (iv) the above is common knowledge.
This work is an attempt to abstract away the formidable challenges
associated with understanding the intricacies of human decision making
to focus on choice adoption effects. The model describes a separation of
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concerns: A two-level model of decision making where the first decision is
whether to choose according to one’s knowledge and preferences or to be
open to the choices of others. The first level decision might be viewed as
comparing the expected benefits of relying on one’s knowledge and prefer-
ences versus leaning on one’s social circle for the decision. The second level
decision then takes two different forms in terms of the choice set: when
an agent is to choose between alternatives according to his/her knowledge
and preferences, the decision boils down to choice probabilities, which may
arise from some single agent choice model; when leaning on the community,
the agent makes a choice over other agents (as opposed to alternatives) in
similar manner. Choices over other agents might depend on (i) expecta-
tions/estimates of the extent to which each other agent’s preferences reflect
the current decision making agent’s, and (ii) expectations/estimates of how
knowledgeable each other agent is. The aforementioned “separation of con-
cerns” affords the modeler some resolution on influence in communities via
the distinction between choice adoption and deciding to personally choose
between alternatives.
Through efficiently computable closed form solutions, the model readily
yields insights on how agents in a recommendation network make choices.
In particular, the concept of decision share, introduced in this paper, neatly
shows how “influence” in a recommendation network is driven by both “cen-
trality” and “decisiveness”. The natural manner through which decision
share enables generalization to more generic choice sets suggests that it is a
natural measure of “influence” in a recommendation network. The model is
potentially applicable to large-scale influence maximization computations.
In particular, the brand ambassador selection problem was introduced and
shown to admit efficiently computable (1− 1
e
)-optimal approximations via a
greedy selection strategy. It also bears repeating that the model presented
in this paper may be considered a “meta-model” of choice. In principle, any
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choice model may be extended to include adopting the action of another
agent as an extension of the choice set, allowing it to be “plugged in” to
this model, thus enabling one to extend existing choice models to model
social network effects.
One outstanding issue is the perennial bugbear of estimation. Qual-
itatively, the source of the difficulty of estimating model parameters
from choice data is non-identifiability arising from the ambiguity between
whether any given selection of an alternative was made through choice
adoption or otherwise. In particular, given any set of choice data gen-
erated from a simulation with P 6= 0, a model with the same frequency
distribution of choice (for each agent) may be obtained by setting P = 0
and {q(j)}j∈C to match the empirical distribution from the data. There-
fore, one cannot expect to estimate a meaningful model from only choice
data. Nevertheless, an approach for building models from choice data and
additional information on the agents is presented in A.1 of the Appendix.
The approach is an attempt to ameliorate the aforementioned identifiability
issues through the use of side information.
Companies like Facebook are actively studying the problem of how
to reasonably quantify and estimate social influence for the purposes of
targeted advertising. These efforts proceed in parallel with “data-driven”
methods that operate at the individual level to learn preferences and thus
enable recommendations that end-users will be receptive to. Loosely speak-
ing, this work is an attempt to be a bridge between the two endeavours,
combining information on individual preferences over alternatives with in-
formation of preferences over the implicit knowledge of other agents. A
challenge that one might raise, then, would be whether the “network-
aspects” can truly ever be separated from the “individual-aspects”. To
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A.1 Estimation of Parameter Regions
In this Annex, an approach for estimating {pik}i∈A,k∈A and {q(j)}j∈C is de-
scribed in a setting where empirical choice shares at an individual level (piij
for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C) are available (possibly arising from choice data), along
with additional information on the agents and their preferences (possibly
via questionnaires).
As in the work of Toubia et al. (2003), the “correct” parameters are
viewed to be an element of a polyhedral set, which will be termed the
“candidate set”, and information about the parameters may be used to
reduce the size of the candidate set. In principle, any point within that set
(or one within its relative interior) may be used as a point estimate. (Toubia
et al. (2003) focus on the analytic center as they use its properties to develop
adaptive questionnaires for conjoint analysis.) Here, the formulation of a
suitable set of linear constraints to define the set will be discussed, after
which an element within it may be drawn to obtain a point estimate of
{pik}i∈A,k∈A and {q(j)}j∈C .
Estimating parameters relating to social influence and social ties has
historically been driven by the available data. As it stands, if one desires
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to fit influence models, one must be willing to compromise and postulate
subsidiary (and possibly ad hoc) models of how available data relates to
the parameters one is trying to estimate (e.g.: data generating models).
Such modelling compromises may be jarringly lacking in rigour, but are a
necessary interface to address the impedance mismatch between clean high-
dimensional models and sparse real world data. What follows proceeds in
this spirit.
Fundamental Constraints
Equations (2.1)-(2.3) describe the primary relationships that are to be re-
spected:




for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C. However, in practice, it may be necessary to add
“slacks” in case a perfect fit is not possible. This is because when data
about the agents’ preferences are used improve estimates (and to avoid the
trivial solution qij = piij for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C, and pik = 0 for all i, k ∈ A),
the problem may become infeasible due to possible inconsistency in that
data. As such, one may consider, instead:
piij + 
+
ij − −ij = qij +
∑
k∈A
pikpikj for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C. (A.1)
Naturally, one would require that
pik ≥ 0 for all i, k ∈ A, (A.2)
pii = 0 for all i ∈ A (A.3)
and
qij ≥ 0, +ij ≥ 0, −ij ≥ 0 for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C. (A.4)
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In contrast to what was proposed for equations (2.1)-(2.3), equation






qij = 1 for all i ∈ A. (A.5)
Incorporating Information
Subsequently, four classes of information on the agents will be modeled as
constraints on agents’ preferences: (i) the relative importance of groups
of agents, (ii) relative preference between choices, (iii) decisiveness of an
agent, and (iv) presence/absence of reliance on other agents (sparsity).
Relative importance of groups of agents. A given agent i ∈ A may rely







where S1 ⊆ A, S2 ⊆ A and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and for some K.
Influence can arise through interaction and simple “following” of a
“leader”. Aside from data on agent to agent interaction on social media,
older consumer tracking tools such as web browser “cookies” can be helpful
in identifying agents who others follow (typically as consumers of content)
but with whom there is not much two-way interaction.
Relative preference between choices. As above, a given agent may have
known preferences across choices. This may be modeled as:
(K −∆)qij2 ≤ qij1 ≤ (K + ∆)qij2 (A.7)
where agent i prefers choice j1 to choice j2 about K times, and ∆ is a
constant that describes the degree of uncertainty in the accuracy of the
81
parameter K. This is especially useful when {qij}j∈C are known up to a
multiplicative constant following estimation via questionnaires and surveys
(these, in some sense, “isolate” agents from their network). Typically, this
should provide |C|(|C| − 1)/2 pairs of inequality constraints per agent, or
|C| − 1 equality constraints when ∆ = 0.














Presence/absence of reliance on other agents (sparsity). Where it is clear
or highly likely that, a given agent i never directly adopts the choice of
another agent k, one may represent this as
pik = 0. (A.9)
This is particularly important because without constraints of this sort, the
dimension of “real-world problems” would become too large to be compu-
tationally tractable in practice.
Specifically, due to the sheer number of parameters in models of social
influence (typically O(|A|2)) such as this one, assumptions about model pa-
rameter sparsity are crucial from the perspective of computation. Thank-
fully, sparsity assumptions find some justification in sociological research, in
particular work relating to the now popularized “Dunbar’s number” which
is the “suggested cognitive limit to the number of people with whom one
can maintain stable social relationships”. Though hardened Bayesians may
object, it is a sensible modeling assumption that absence of evidence that
an agent might have been “influenced by another” (e.g.: the former having
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viewed information put forward by the latter presenting a perspective on a
alternatives in a product category) might be interpreted a zero in P . Spar-
sity assumptions enable one to reduce the number of model parameters
from O(|A|2) to O(|A|).
Adjusting the Polyhedron so That It Is Nonempty
As a preprocessing step, to ensure that the polyhedron to be searched for
a point estimate of the model parameters is non-empty, one might solve a
linear optimization problem comprising constraints (A.1)-(A.5) as well as
constraints of the form (A.6)-(A.9). The goal of doing this is to find the
“smallest” slack variables necessary for feasibility. To this end, multiple
objectives are possible, for example, one might minimize the largest ratio
of +ij + 
−
ij to piij. Once the foregoing optimization problem is solved, one
obtains a polyhedron described by constraints (A.1)-(A.5) (albeit with the
·ij’s fixed), and the same constraints of the form (A.6)-(A.9). Denote this
polyhedron S.
Computing an Estimate for {pik}i∈A,k∈A and {q(j)}j∈C
At this point, one may finally solve an optimization problem to maximize,
over {pik}i∈A,k∈A and {q(j)}j∈C in S, the distance to the planes defined
by the inequality constraints (A.6)-(A.8). Should the optimal value of this
problem be 0, the constraints which are satisfied with equality for all points
of S should be replaced with equality constraints and the resulting problem
solved. This should be repeated until either no inequality constraints are
left, or a strictly positive optimal value is obtained.
In either case, the final solution provides a point estimate. However, in
the latter case, one has a point in the relative interior which may be used
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